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SUPREME
COURT
OF NEW YORK,
Kelekian:
Due Process
APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT
Encarnacion v. Goord'
(decided June 17, 2004)
Jose Encarnacion was charged with violating prison
disciplinary rules while incarcerated. Following a hearing, he was
found guilty and his visitation rights were suspended.
Encarnacion claimed that the penalty of suspending his
visitation privileges violated his constitutional rights.' He claimed
that his right to visitation was a liberty interest, protected by the
federal and state constitutions.4 The Appellate Division rejected
this claim stating that "[i]nmate visitation is not a liberty interest
entitled to

the protection

of either the

federal

charged

violating

or state

constitutions.' '5

Encarnacion

"was

with

prison

disciplinary rules prohibiting possession of money, promoting
prison contraband, smuggling, solicitation, and conspiring to
introduce drugs into the correctional facility where he was
incarcerated." 6

Prison officials conducted investigations and

uncovered that Encarnacion and fourteen other inmates had been

2'778

N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).

Id.at 563.

Id. at 564.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "No State shall ...
deprix e any rerso-, of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ..
"
N.Y COST. Pt. 1.§ 6 provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived

of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
5 Encarnacion,778

N.Y.S.2d at 564 (citing Kentucky Dep't. of Corrections v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989); Matter of Vasquez v. Coombe, 655
N.Y.S.2d 694, 695 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)).
6 Id
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sending money to his fiancde in exchange for quantities of heroin.7
There were two misbehavior reports "detailing a number of
suspicious transactions conducted between [Encamicion], his
fiancee, and other inmates." 8

The reports also contained

information regarding Encarnacion's refusal to submit to a
urinalysis test as well as positive drug test results of the other
inmates.9 These factors, coupled with Encarnacion's guilty plea to
all but the drug offense, constituted substantial evidence of his
guilt.

°

The Appellate Division, in a short decision, stated that
Encarnacion did not have a federal or state protected liberty
interest in his rights to visitation. A liberty interest is an interest
"protected by the due process clause [that is either] derived directly
from the due process clause itself, or ...from the laws of the
state."" The court relied on the United States Supreme Court case,
Kentucky Department of Correctionsv. Thompson."2 In that case,
the Court stated that "'the interest must rise to more than an
'abstract need or desire' and must be based on more than a
'unilateral hope.' ,,13 "[A]n individual claiming a protected interest
must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."' 4 The Court held
that "[tihe denial of prison access to a particular visitor is 'well
71d.

8id.
9

1d.
0
1 Encarnacion,778

N.Y.S.2d. at 564.
" Marino v. Klages, 973 F. Supp. 275, 277 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
12 490 U.S. 454 (1989).
13 Id. at 460. (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972);
Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981)).
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within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a
prison sentence' and therefore is not independently protected by
the Due Process Clause."' 5
In Thompson, inmates at the Kentucky State penitentiary
brought a class action suit challenging the actions of the state
penitentiary in their denial of a constitutionally protected "liberty
interest in receiving certain visitors."' 6 The commonwealth-issued
CorrectionsPolicies and Procedures governing general visitations
privileges included a non-exhaustive list of people who could be
denied visitation with the inmates. 7 Litigation was brought about
by two separate incidents in which applicants were denied the
opportunity to visit an inmate.'

One inmate's mother was denied

future visitations because she brought with her a person who had
been barred for smuggling contraband.

9

Another visitor was

denied visitation because after she left, the inmate she was visiting
was found to be in possession of contraband."0
The Thompson Court stated that "a State creates a protected
liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official
discretion." 2 ' The Court noted that past decisions have suggested
that the most common way for the state to create "a liberty interest
is by establishing a 'substantive predicate' " to govern the decision
14Id
'5Id

at 461 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)).
Id. at 455-56.
17Thompson, 490 U.S. at 456.
1Id at 458.

16

19Id

20 id.
21

Id. at 462 (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983)).
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making process and by mandating the outcome to be reached when
relevant criteria have been met.22 The Seventh Circuit Federal
Court has used the formula "if X (the substantive predicate), then
Y (the specified outcome, from which the enforcement officials are
not free to depart)" in order to clarify what the phrase "substantive
predicate" meant.23 To facilitate the decision-making process,
"explicitly mandatory language" must be used.24 Further refining
what it meant, the Court in Thompson defined explicitly mandatory
language as "specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the
regulations'

substantive

predicates are present,

a particular

outcome must follow, in order to create a liberty interest."2
Plainly stated, the Supreme Court in Thompson concluded that "the
use of 'explicitly mandatory language,' in connection with the
establishment

of 'specified

substantive predicates'

to

limit

discretion, forces a conclusion that the State has created a liberty
interest."26
In Vasquez v. Coomb 7 an inmate was denied visitation time
with a person who "was not to be admitted [into] the [correctional]
facility because she was believed to be engaged in activities that
posed a threat to the security of the facility."

2

New York's

Appellate Division, following the decision in Thompson, affirmed
that inmate visitation is not an interest protected by the state or
22
23
24

Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462 (citing Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472).
Smith v. Shettle, 946 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1991).
Thompson, at 463 (citing Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72).

25 Id.
26 id.

27

655 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
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federal government. 9 Under New York law, "a superintendent
*may deny, limit, suspend or revoke the visitation privileges of any
inmate or visitor to visit each other if the superintendent has
reasonable cause to believe that such action is necessary to
0
maintain the safety, security, and good order of the facility." 3
The Vasquez court also relied on the decision in Victory v.
Coughlin.1

Victory, while outside the correctional facility for

dental treatment, persuaded guards to remove his shackles so that
he could enter a hotel room and spend some "private time" with his
wife.

32

Victory and his wife then escaped and remained at large

for about three years.33

When Victory was apprehended and

incarcerated, his wife pleaded guilty to obstructing governmental
administration and was sentenced to a term of five years'
probation.34 Victory was denied further visitation with his wife
whom the superintendent of the correctional facility felt posed a
security risk to the facility. 5 The crux of Victory's argument was
that he had a "fundamental right to visitation protected by the State
Constitution."36' He relied principally on Cooper v. Morin, which
held that "a policy of noncontact visitation with respect to pretrial
detainees is unreasonable unless supported by a strong showing of
28 ldat 695.

Id. (citing Thompson, 490 U.S. at 468 (1989); Victory v. Coughlin, 568
N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)).
29

30

3'
32

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS tit.7, § 200.5(a) (2004).
568 N.Y.S.2d. 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
Victory, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 186-87.

33

1d. at 187.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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In Cooper, over ninety percent of the women in the

facility were pretrial detainees.3" The court had to decide "whether
a pretrial detainee has a right to contact visitation with her
family.

' 39

The pretrial detainee in Cooper, unlike the defendants

Victory, Vasquez, Thompson and Encamacion, all of whom were
convicted of a crime and serving out their respective sentences,
enjoyed the presumption of innocence. Presumption of innocence
is "the fundamental principal that an individual cannot be punished
under our American system of criminal jurisprudence unless the
State comes forward with evidence sufficient to convince the trier
of fact."4

The Victory court distinguished the reasoning of

Cooper, claiming that there is a "clear distinction between the
rights of pretrial detainees and those of inmates involuntarily
incarcerated for having been convicted of a crime."'" The Victory
court held that visitation privileges, although "generally permitted
within the State's correctional facilities," do not rise "to the level
of a 'protected interest' under the State Constitution.

42

The court

also stated that "[w]hen access to a program is based upon
objective criteria and enjoyment of participation is contingent upon

3'Victor, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 187 (citing Coope, 399 N.E.2d. 1188, 1195 (N.Y..
1979)).
38Cooper, 399 N.E.2d at 1191.
'9Id at 1190.
40 Id. at 1197 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
41Victory, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
42 Id.(citing Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 405 N.E.2d. 225, 226-27
(N.Y.1980)).
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subjective factors, a 'legitimate expectation' is not warranted and
no constitutional right arises."43
Both the federal and state courts have held that the
suspension of visitation privileges does not violate an inmate's
constitutional rights. The New York courts reasoned that an inmate
may be denied particular visitation privileges because a prison
sentence contemplates a term of confinement' whereas the United
States Supreme Court in Thompson recognized the discretion of
the official in charge, focusing more on the language of the statute
or regulation rather than the actual deprivation.45 This does not
mean that state law will never create an enforceable liberty
interest. The federal case law suggests that states can create a
liberty interest by establishing substantive predicates guiding the
discretion of the superintendent.46 "If substantive predicates are
present, a particular outcome must follow in order to create a
liberty interest."47
In summation, prison officials have the right to deny, limit,
suspend or revoke visitation privileges if there is reason to believe
that such action is necessary to maintain the safety, security and,
welfare of the facility. 8 Neither the federal nor the New York
State constitutions protect an inmate who is deprived of his or her

Id.(citing Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d. 536, 540 (N.Y. 1987)).
Vasquez, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 694.
Martinez v. Coombe, No. 95-CV-1 147, 1996 WL 596553, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.
Aug. 22, 1996).
16Thompson,
490 U.S. at 463.
13

44
45

47 id.

48 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS tit.7, § 200.5(a) (2004).
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visitation rights because inmate visitation is not a protected liberty
interest.

Kristen Kelekian
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